The MTA's New OMNY Scanners Have Cameras In Them (But They're Not Watching You, Yet)
June 14, 2019, 1 p.m.
Still, the cameras, which weren't previously disclosed, raise many ongoing privacy concerns.

The camera is just under the OMNY scanning screen
OMNY, the MTA's new tap-to-pay system being piloted at 16 subway stations and on all Staten Island bus routes, has exceeded the MTA's forecasts during the first week of operation, with tens of thousands of riders opting to use a digital wallet or contactless credit card instead of their MetroCard. OMNY is scheduled to be rolled out across the entire subway and bus system, and on commuter railroads, to ultimately replace the MetroCard and usher in a new era of commuting ("new" for New York, anyway).
However, you may not have known that the scanners contain a camera, along with infrared illuminators, situated at the kiosk's base. A tipster pointed them out to us, noting that they spotted the "small laptop style hidden camera" and illuminators, and wondered if they were used for "infrared based facial recognition to obtain a clearer image of the face."
"The camera and illuminators in the OMNY validators are only in place to support future use of bar code and QR code for ticketing; they cannot and do not support biometrics of any kind," said Steve Brunner, general manager, New York Tri-State Region, for Cubic Transportation Systems.
Cubic is the company behind OMNY fare payment system; they work with transit systems around the world, including Hong Kong, London, San Francisco, Chicago, and Washington, D.C. Cubic also has a division that specializes in defense ("help[ing] customers effectively equip and train warfighters and law enforcement personnel, in turn making the world a safer place"). We have asked Cubic for details on the camera's make and model.
The MTA emphatically stated that the OMNY cameras are currently disabled and are physically incapable of being used for facial recognition. (And after all, there are plenty of regular cameras installed all over the subway system.)
However, the presence of cameras—even ones that may only be for bar code and QR code scanning—still worried critics, who reiterated overall privacy concerns with OMNY.
Albert Fox Cahn, executive director of the privacy group Surveillance Technology Oversight Project, noted that OMNY's privacy policy neglects to mention anything about cameras—the words "barcode, camera, infrared, scanner, photo, video, image (apart from an unrelated reference to website tracking), and recording" were not found.

The OMNY scanner (Jen Chung / Gothamist)
"Unfortunately, it’s hard to know what the full range of capabilities for these cameras are without more technical data. There are certainly some barcode scanners (such as in many grocery check-out aisles) that are incapable of being used for computer vision or facial recognition. Yet at the same time there are many camera systems that could be used for both barcode and facial recognition," Cahn told Gothamist. "It’s disappointing that the MTA just wants us to take them on their word that these hidden features have a limited capabilities, rather than having an open design process that would actually reassure New Yorkers."
The lack of an open design was also remarked upon by Jonathan Stribling-Uss, a
Technologist Fellow at the NYCLU. "I think the OMNY system has not had enough transparency about its data storage and sharing procedures," he said. "We don’t have enough information about how these systems have been built."
The MTA plans to make OMNY available on all subways and buses, including the Staten Island Railway, by the end of 2020, with commuters using contactless credit/debit cards and digital wallets (MetroCard will still be an option). Then, in 2021, the OMNY card, which customers can buy with cash or credit, will be introduced. After OMNY is also adopted on the Long Island Rail Road and Metro-North, the MetroCard will be completely phased out.
The RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) technology utilized by contactless credit or debit cards has been an area of concern for the NYCLU. In February, Stribling-Uss testified at a New York City Council hearing about the city's IDNYC program using the technology for its ID cards:
The City has not informed us of the specific contactless technology or vendor they are considering for the new IDNYC card, but contactless technology opens up the very real possibility that location, usage patterns, and IDNYC ownership can be remotely “sniffed” by third parties, creating acute new privacy risks for card-holders. “Contactless” technology means that information stored on the IDNYC - and without question, the existence and use of the card itself - could be revealed from a distance without the card-holder’s knowledge or consent. And because the IDNYC was designed in large part to ensure that already vulnerable New Yorkers - including those without secured immigration status - could access basic services, even the fact that an individual holds an IDNYC could be information of interest to law enforcement agencies. Data related to the IDNYC could then be obtained by the NYPD, FBI, ICE, or Department of Homeland Security.
Further, RFID technology is also vulnerable to potential hacking in "relay attacks" where someone's card could be used by another individual within 3-50 feet.
In Hong Kong, most subway riders on the MTR use a rechargeable card called the Octopus, which can also be used to pay for items at stores. But with the current clash between protesters and police over a bill that would allow Hong Kong residents to be extradited to China, there is a growing concern over the Hong Kong police using Octopus card data to track the protesters' movements:
There is usually never a line at the train ticketing machines. Judging from an overheard convo, it appears that people are reluctant to use their rechargeable Octopus cards for fear of leaving a paper trail of them having been present at the protest. pic.twitter.com/s1rsgSnCqL
— Mary Hui (@maryhui) June 12, 2019
Using data from cashless, prepaid Octopus cards to track down suspects is not new.
As early as 2010, HK police used such data to trace a murder suspect, as seen in this China Daily story https://t.co/UmQDcoMAFJ pic.twitter.com/lDoygZz5em— Mary Hui (@maryhui) June 13, 2019
Prosecutors said this marked the first murder case where a MetroCard was key evidence, according to this New York Post story https://t.co/Z6KnOKirWZ\ pic.twitter.com/uEsnm5w9O7
— Mary Hui (@maryhui) June 13, 2019
Last year, Cubic was testing facial recognition technology in London for a future "gateless gatelines" entry system. One of the main goals of OMNY—and, really, any other transit system—is to speed up the time it takes for someone to enter; one of the benefits of OMNY is to end the "notorious failed swipe."
Cahn, of STOP, also referred to the MTA's response to the implementation of fare evasion cameras in Times Square earlier this year. Screens showing commuters entering the station, with the words "Recording in progress" and the logo of a facial recognition company, WISENET, were just a decoy, according to MTA spokesman Maxwell Young, who said there was no facial recognition technology being used, "These cameras are purely for the purpose of deterring fare evasion — if you see yourself on a monitor, you’re less likely to evade the fare."
"If an agency is openly misleading about surveillance technology in one setting," Cahn said, "Why do I have to take them at their word about another?"